Investigating friction dynamics in complex systems where competing interests generate structural conflict. Formalizing the coordination costs that multi-agent systems impose.
A pre-game-theoretic framework that formalizes why coordination fails before strategy even begins.
Game theory assumes agents are already participating. It models what happens after the game begins but says nothing about how agents enter strategic interaction, why payoff structures take certain forms, or what happens when participation itself is refused. The Axiom of Consent addresses the structural layer beneath: the conditions under which optimization is delegated, and the friction that emerges when those conditions are violated.
The framework introduces a measurable friction function over three kernel variables—alignment, stakes, and entropy—that predicts coordination costs across political, economic, and computational systems. Where traditional models assume equilibria, the Axiom of Consent formalizes why some systems never reach them.
Convergence of optimization targets between principal and agent. When alignment is high, delegation is cheap. When it collapses, friction dominates.
Magnitude of optimization being delegated. Higher stakes amplify every misalignment. Small disagreements become structural failures when enough is at risk.
Efficiency loss in optimization transfer. Even perfectly aligned agents lose information in delegation. Entropy is the irreducible cost of coordination.
Each programme applies the consent-friction framework to a different substrate, testing whether the formal machinery generalizes.
Consent-holding theory, delegation legitimacy, governance alignment functions.
4 papers Programme IISubstrate-independent moral status, AI political standing, relational functionalism.
1 paper Programme IIIDerivatives as remedy and poison, the hedging paradox, systemic risk architectures.
4 papers Programme IVEmpirical friction validation in cryptocurrency markets, event studies, volatility regimes.
5 papers Programme VIdentity, consciousness, substrates, the replicator-optimization mechanism.
6 papers Programme VIMachine learning, AI safety, computational models of cognition, trauma as training failure.
5 papersCore publications that define the research programme.
Introduces the friction function and the kernel triple (α, σ, ε) as a formal framework for analyzing coordination costs that precede strategic interaction.
ROM provides the meta-theory: configurations generating less friction persist longer. Consent-respecting arrangements are dynamical attractors in optimization space.
TARCH-X event study demonstrating that cryptocurrency markets respond asymmetrically to infrastructure versus regulatory shocks—empirical evidence for friction dynamics.
Applies the consent framework to artificial agents, arguing that stake-holding capacity—not consciousness—grounds political consideration.