Adversarial Systems & Complexity Research Initiative

Friction in systems that compete.

ASCRI investigates friction dynamics in complex systems where competing interests generate structural conflict, formalising the coordination costs that multi-agent systems impose across governance, markets, and cognition.


Focus Multi-agent friction
Programmes Five domains
Status Active research
Read the framework → Programmes
01 · Core framework

The Axiom of Consent

Game theory assumes agents are already participating. It models what happens after the game begins but says nothing about how agents enter strategic interaction, why payoff structures take certain forms, or what happens when participation itself is refused. The Axiom of Consent addresses the structural layer beneath: the conditions under which optimisation is delegated, and the friction that emerges when those conditions are violated.

The framework introduces a measurable friction function over three kernel variables (alignment, stakes, and entropy) that predicts coordination costs across political, economic, and computational systems. Where traditional models assume equilibria, the Axiom of Consent formalises why some systems never reach them.

Friction function F = σ · (1 + ε) / (1 + α)

α   Alignment

Convergence of optimisation targets between principal and agent. When alignment is high, delegation is cheap. When it collapses, friction dominates.

σ   Stakes

Magnitude of optimisation being delegated. Higher stakes amplify every misalignment. Small disagreements become structural failures when enough is at risk.

ε   Entropy

Efficiency loss in optimisation transfer. Even perfectly aligned agents lose information in delegation. Entropy is the irreducible cost of coordination.

Read the full framework →
02 · Research programmes

Five domains of friction

Each programme applies the consent-friction framework to a different substrate, testing whether the formal machinery generalises.

03 · Featured work

Selected papers

Core publications that anchor the programme. Full papers are published on dissensus.ai.

View all publications on dissensus.ai →